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Abstract 
Shareholder activists play a key role in monitoring managerial behaviour. This study was undertaken 
given the paucity of research on the shareholder activism as practised by individual shareholders. 
Accordingly, the motives, modus operandi and sources of salience of Mr Theo Botha, a well-known 
shareholder activist in South Africa, were investigated. Document analysis and an in-depth interview 
conducted with Botha revealed that he not only has a clear goal, but is also very passionate about 
achieving his goal. Botha prepares meticulously before engaging companies across the economic 
spectrum. In addition to possessing normative power, Botha also exhibits individual, pragmatic and 
societal legitimacy. His assertiveness, persistence and willingness to apply his own resources 
significantly contribute to his prominence as a corporate watchdog. Shareholder activists who wish to 
become more salient (irrespective of their size) could learn from Botha’s experiences over the past 
decade.  
Keywords 
Board diversity, Gender diversity, Race diversity, Accounting-based financial performance, Market-based 
financial performance 
Shareholder activism, shareholder engagement, corporate governance, shareholder salience, normative power, 
















*Prof S Viviers is professor in the Department of Business Management, Stellenbosch University, South Africa 
[sviviers@sun.ac.za].  
Viviers 
348 Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences | JEF | July 2016 9(2), pp. 347-369 
1. INTRODUCTION  
First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win. 
This quote by Mahatma Gandhi (1897-1948) aptly captures the essence of what many activists 
experience in their endeavours to bring about change.  
Shareholder activists are investors who use their equity stake in the companies in which they 
invest (hereafter called investee companies) to ask questions and demand corporate 
accountability. Shareholder activism has long been an important mechanism to limit managers’ 
divergence from the goal of maximising shareholders’ wealth (Partnoy & Thomas, 2005). Investors 
who seek to influence the nature of policies and practices of investee companies can employ 
different mechanisms to do so. They can engage in private discussions with management, file 
shareholder resolutions, ask questions and vote at annual general meetings (AGMs). They can also 
initiate litigation, voice their concerns in the media or divest from companies that fail to 
transform (Nordén & Strand, 2011).  
One of the first examples of public shareholder activism occurred in the 1960s when shareholders 
divested from Dow Chemical for supplying toxins such as napalm and Agent Orange to the U.S. 
military in Vietnam (Welker & Wood, 2011). Shareholder activism is a growing phenomenon at 
present (Poulsen, Strand & Thomsen, 2010) and is mainly practised by institutional investors 
across the globe (Blume & Keim, 2012; Hadani, Goranova & Khan, 2011; Lantz, Montandrau & 
Sahut, 2010; Wen, 2009). Institutional investors, such as pension funds, invest large amounts of 
capital into financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, commodities and foreign exchange, 
either for their own gain, or on behalf of other institutions or individuals. Shareholder activists 
currently engage companies on a wide range of ethical as well as environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) risks (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010). 
Given the size and ability of institutional investors to influence corporate decisions the majority 
of shareholder activism research centres on these investors. As far as could be established, no 
research has focused exclusively on the shareholder activism endeavours of individual (retail) 
investors. In contrast to institutional investors, individual investors are investors who own stock 
in a company in their personal capacity. The paucity of research in this field is probably due to the 
fact that individual shareholders are not seen as salient shareholders, where salience is defined 
as the degree to which management gives priority to the claims of a particular shareholder 
(Gifford, 2010:79). Two notable exceptions include that of Carl Ichan in the US (Foley, 2014) and 
Theo Botha in South Africa (Bhana, 2010; Mamtse, 2007).  
Theo Botha is not the only individual shareholder activist in South Africa, but he is by far the most 
prominent one (Barron, 2011; Hogg, 2009; Shevel, 2014). Botha was born on 1 March 1960 and 
obtained a Bachelor of Commerce (Honours) degree in Accounting at the University of South 
Africa. He completed his articles at PricewaterhouseCoopers, but returned to his family’s farm in 
1987 after his father passed away (Steyn, 2011). Botha is currently part-owner and director of CA 
Governance, a leading independent corporate governance practitioner in South Africa (CA 
Governance, 2014).  
After making a small investment in The Sage Group, a South African life assurance company, in 
2002, Botha discovered that the company failed to disclose losses in its US operations to local 
shareholders (Keeping tycoons on their toes, 2007). He privately questioned management on the 
omission only to be told that the company’s financial statements complied with the legal 
disclosure requirements in South Africa. Unsatisfied with management’s response, Botha raised 
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the issue at Sage’s AGM. As he received the same brush-off as earlier, he decided to approach the 
media. Not only did the company’s share price decrease dramatically in response to the media 
reports, but its credit rating was also downgraded a few weeks later (Planting, 2012).  
Since his initial deliberations with The Sage Group, Botha has engaged numerous companies listed 
on the Johannesburg and London Stock Exchanges. His efforts in highlighting unsatisfactory 
accounting, financial and ESG practices has earned him a reputation as a corporate watchdog - 
a ‘terrier’ to be more specific (Creamer, 2009; Shevel, 2014). The so-called ‘Botha sting’ has been 
shown to result in a significant decrease in the target company’s share price directly after his 
public criticism (Bhana, 2010).  
Given that there has been limited research on individual shareholder activism, the objective of 
this article was threefold. In the first instance, an investigation on Botha’s motives for engaging 
public companies was launched. This was followed by an analysis of Botha’s modus operandi as 
an individual shareholder activist. Specific attention was given to the nature of engagements, the 
type of companies that came under Botha’s magnifying glass and the issues raised. Thirdly, 
Botha’s actions were evaluated in terms of the three sources of shareholder salience as 
postulated by Gifford (2010), namely power, legitimacy and urgency.  
If shareholder activists, large or small, want to become more prominent watchdogs and change 
agents, they should give more attention to the manner in which they engage investee companies. 
Insight into what is required to be an effective shareholder activist can be gleaned from Botha’s 
character and actions. The remainder of this article is structured as follows: key constructs 
associated with shareholder activism and salience will be defined next, followed by a brief 
overview of the methods used to collect and analyse data. Pertinent conclusions are then drawn 
from Botha’s motives, modus operandi and sources of salience as an individual shareholder 
activist.  
2. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
Since shareholders are the owners of a company, they have an interest in and right to consult with 
management on issues which influence shareholder value. Financially motivated shareholder 
activists therefore typically pressure management to spin off loss-making divisions, reduce 
executive compensation and increase dividend pay-outs (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Although most 
shareholder activism is financially oriented (Gantchev, 2013; Ntim, Opong & Danbolt, 2012), 
social shareholder activism is also on the rise. Socially oriented shareholder activists endeavour 
to create a more just society and typically probe companies on issues relating to sustainability 
and human rights (Hendry, Sanderson, Barker & Roberts, 2007; Judge, Gaur & Muller-Kahle, 2010). 
In South Africa, non-financial shareholder activism has mainly focused on public companies’ 
compliance with the King reports on corporate governance (Lekhesa, 2009; Rademeyer & 
Holtzhausen, 2004).  
Investors’ preferences for public versus private activism depend to a large extent on the culture 
in a particular country. Evidence suggests that shareholder activists in the US prefer public 
activism (Davis & Han Kim, 2007; Poulsen et al., 2010), whereas their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom (UK) prefer private activism (Cohen, 2011; Becht, Franks, Mayer & Rossi, 2010; Winfield, 
2011). Investors’ preferences for specific engagement mechanisms also depend on their ability to 
access management. Access has been shown to be all but impossible for individual investors. They 
are therefore forced to use public forms of shareholder activism, such as asking probing questions 
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at AGMs. Research shows that the presence of individual shareholder activists at AGMs is often 
seen as an annoyance by management. Be this as it may, the actions of these so-called ‘gadflies’ 
have, in some instances, resulted in managers revising their policies for fear of reputational 
damage (De Bakker & Den Hond, 2008). 
3. SHAREHOLDER SALIENCE 
Shareholder salience can be defined as the degree to which managers give priority to the claims 
of a particular shareholder (Gifford, 2010). It consists of three overarching attributes, namely 
power, legitimacy and urgency. More details on these attributes are presented in TABLE 1.  
Power refers to the extent to which a shareholder can gain access to coercive, utilitarian or 
normative means to impose his or her will on the investee company. Institutional investors with 
significant stakes in investee companies are more likely to use coercive power (through the 
provision or withdrawal of capital) to bring about corporate change in investee companies 
(Sjöstrom, 2008). Legitimacy refers to a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity or individual are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. 
TABLE 1: Attributes of shareholder salience 
Attribute Sources of salience 
Power Coercive Use of formal shareholder rights through resolutions. 
Replacement of directors or chief executive officer (CEO). 
Legal proceedings to enforce shareholder rights. 
Successful lobbying for regulation. 
Utilitarian Provision or withdrawal of capital or other resources from companies 
(investment or divestment). 
Normative Public or private statements, shareholder resolutions or other 
activities that affect the company’s or individual managers’ 
reputations.  
Legitimacy Individual Expertise, experience, status and credibility of the individual 
engaging the company. 
Organisational Legitimate claim on the company (e.g. large shareholding, high-risk 
stake). 
Alignment between the shareholder’s interests and those of the 
company. 
Perception that the shareholder organisation is a credible and 
respected member of the investment community. 
Consistency of messaging from different parts of the shareholder 
organisation. 
Pragmatic The shareholder has a strong argument for why the proposed action is 
in the interests of the company. 
The shareholder provides new information to the company. 
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Attribute Sources of salience 
Societal The shareholder embodies or reflects a position widely accepted in 
society. 
Existence of norms or codes of conduct. 
Supportive political and policy environment. 
Urgency Time-
sensitivity 
Shareholder resolutions at AGMs. 
Benchmarks with deadlines for response. 
Use of other forms of deadlines to create time pressure. 
Criticality Assertiveness of tone. 
Persistence. 
Willingness to apply resources. 
Source: Gifford (2010:80) 
All four types of legitimacy, be it individual, organisational, pragmatic or societal, are applicable 
to institutional shareholders. In cases where the activist is an individual shareholder (as in 
Botha’s case), organisational legitimacy becomes irrelevant. The third source of shareholder 
salience is that of urgency, and indicates the degree to which a shareholder’s claims call for 
immediate attention from the investee company. Once again, institutional shareholders are more 
likely to obtain cooperation from investee companies than individual shareholders.  
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
Given the exploratory nature of the study, a phenomenological research paradigm was deemed 
appropriate for this study (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). The adoption of this paradigm had two further 
advantages. Firstly, it enabled the researcher to attach meaning to the phenomenon of individual 
shareholder activism rather than merely measuring it. Secondly, it gave the researcher an 
opportunity to interact personally with the subject. This interaction proved invaluable, as 
questions about personal convictions and challenges could be raised in person.  
As mentioned earlier, Botha is not the only individual shareholder activist in South Africa. Over 
the years individuals such as Issy Goldberg, Roy McAlpine, Chris Logan and a gentleman 
colloquially called ‘Mr Hayden’ also made headlines for questioning companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) on financial, accounting and governance irregularities 
(Barron, 2011; Carte 2011c; Mamtse, 2007; Mathews & Hasenfuss 2013). Botha was, however, 
selected as the research subject in this study, as he is seen as the most prominent individual 
shareholder activist in the country (Gardee, 2014; Mpofu, 2013; Shevel, 2014).  
Qualitative data was collected in two phases. In the first instance, secondary data on Botha’s 
engagements from May 2002 to July 2014 was sourced from local newspapers, magazines and 
academic journal articles. An analysis of the documentary evidence was then supplemented by an 
in-depth personal interview with Botha in July 2013. The interview shed light on Botha’s raison 
d’être, modus operandi as well as his views on various aspects of shareholder activism in South 
Africa. To address the problems of selective deposit and selective survival associated with 
documentary evidence (Babbie & Mouton, 2001), follow-up discussions were held with Botha to 
verify the data collected. This process resulted in the addition of a number of engagements.  
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The collected data was codified to determine recurrent patterns and inconsistencies. The three 
phases of deductive qualitative content analysis as proposed by Elo and Kyngäs (2007) were 
employed in this study. A structured analysis matrix was developed and used to code the 
secondary and primary data. The creation of categories specifically enabled the researcher to 
evaluate Botha’s sources of salience relative to Gifford’s (2010) theoretical framework.  
Given the nature of the study, Botha’s anonymity could not be protected. He consented to this 
study and had the opportunity to verify the accuracy of data contained in this article. A certain 
degree of subjectivity might be evident in the results, as the focus of the study was to highlight 
the factors that could contribute to Botha’s salience as an individual shareholder activist.  
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
In the following section, reference to the interview with Botha will be indicated as (TB). Other data 
sources reporting on Botha’s activism endeavours will be referenced by giving the relevant 
author’s name in brackets.  
5.1 What drives Theo Botha as an individual shareholder activist?  
The data analysis revealed that Botha is driven by the aspiration to hold directors and managers 
accountable, to protect the interests of other (typically minority) shareholders, to stimulate 
public debate and to expose unwarranted agency costs. Botha is primarily motivated by his desire 
to keep big corporates on their toes (Steyn, 2011), particularly as it pertains to corporate 
transparency and accountability (Crotty, 2009b; Planting, 2012). With the phasing in of the 
second King report on good corporate governance (King II) in 2002, many South African companies 
were saying that they were adhering to King II ‘as if nothing had changed from King I’ (TB). Botha 
thus started to investigate listed companies’ adherence to these guidelines. ‘It became a matter 
of exposing directors. They say they are independent, yet some have been directors for 20 years … 
they are bound to lose independence. And there’s nobody to question them’ (TB in Mamtse, 2007).  
Unfortunately, not much has changed since the introduction of the third King report (King III) in 
2009 (Barron, 2011; Hogg, 2010). ‘Everybody is just saying King II and King III are good and the 
auditors are stamping it. But nobody is holding companies to account’ (TB). As a shareholder 
watchdog, Botha thus ensures that those issues that companies would rather keep to themselves 
are publicised (Barron, 2008). Botha is widely regarded as a passionate ‘crusader for good 
corporate governance’ in South Africa (Carte, 2009; Hasenfuss, 2006), and has particularly a 
strong opinion about executive remuneration (Crotty, 2012a; Hogg, 2010).  
At one AGM, Botha wanted to know why the company was so ‘generous’ towards the chairman of 
the remuneration committee and the chairman of the board, in the light of weak shareholder 
returns in the preceding year (Hogg, 2008). Botha has recently broadened his accountability focus 
to include matters pertaining to environmental and social risk management. His watchdog status 
is aptly captured in Shevel’s (2014) headline: ‘Terrier-like Botha keeps companies on a leash’.  
Being described as the ‘face of minority shareholder activism’ in South Africa (Harris, 2011b; 
Mpofu, 2013), Botha has first-hand experience of being marginalised. Much of his engagement 
with South African companies has thus been undertaken to protect and promote the interests of 
other individual and minority shareholders (Hasenfuss, 2009b; Mchunu, 2007b; Schumacher, 
2009). Botha is furthermore driven by the desire to raise public awareness on socially relevant 
INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE CASE OF THEO BOTHA 
Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences | JEF | July 2016 9(2), pp. 347-369 353 
issues. In the South African context, these issues typically centre on Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE), HIV/AIDS and the ever-increasing wage gap (Barron, 2014; Gilmour, 
2014; Sathekge, 2011; Tarrant, 2013).  
His motivation for raising these concerns in the public domain is because companies simply ‘pay 
lip service to corporate governance and nobody really cares’ (Keeping tycoons on their toes, 
2007). Botha is also quite critical of the high level of apathy among local shareholders, especially 
large institutional shareholders such as the Public Investment Corporation (Hogg, 2010; Mathews 
& Hasenfuss, 2013).  
Botha’s contribution to the transformation debate in South Africa was acknowledged by the Black 
Management Forum in 2008, when they bestowed their highest leadership award on him (Radebe, 
2008). In their role as social commentators, journalists often highlight his influence on corporate 
decision-making. Hogg (2009) even thanked Botha for challenging South African executives on 
the issue of remuneration - ‘the more you [Botha] shine a light into dark areas, the more things 
can change’. A year later, the same author applauded Botha for ‘pointing out these issues and 
raising the public’s awareness of executive remuneration … which remains a festering sore’ (Hogg, 
2010). As Botha does not benefit financially from his activism endeavours, the researcher is of the 
opinion that he sees his work as a higher calling.  
5.2 How does Botha engage companies in his capacity as an individual 
shareholder activist?  
Botha claims that there is no specific pattern in selecting target companies. Instead, his interest 
in a particular company is piqued by newspaper articles highlighting problematic corporate 
behaviour. In line with institutional investors (Sjöstrom, 2008), Botha also targets large, well-
known companies. These companies tend to be in the firing line, as they have significant socio-
economic and environmental footprints. Changes in corporate policies and practices in these 
companies are thus likely to have more substantial impacts than if the same changes occurred in 
smaller companies. Once a company has been selected, Botha prepares meticulously for 
meetings. It could take him up to five hours to examine an annual report. He reads at least five 
years’ of annual reports before attending a company’s AGM (Barron, 2008) and scrutinises 
circulars and information posted on the web (TB; Tredway, 2004). ‘From the Sage experience in 
2002 I’ve learnt to read through a company’s public information very closely’ (TB).  
Careful attention to detail in annual reports has enabled Botha to uncover a number of accounting 
errors and inconsistencies (as with The Sage Group in 2002). In 2009, Botha exposed a gross error 
in calculating the emolument package of a prominent director. In commenting on the mistake, 
Hasenfuss (2009c) wrote: ‘Did they [referring to the remuneration committee] not spot the cock-
up, which was apparently easily picked up by Botha? What would have happened if Botha had not 
raised the issue of the conspicuously inflated package?’ The same journalist acknowledged that 
Botha is often seen as ‘a pedantic nit-picker’, pointing out that this character trait is valuable in 
exposing ‘cracks in management’.  
Whilst preparing for an AGM, Botha often requests the minutes of previous years’ meetings. He 
admits that there are often hurdles to accessing company data, especially if he is not a 
shareholder of the particular company. Steyn (2011), however, observes that Botha is ‘never 
fazed’ by this and simply buys one share. Botha occasionally informs management that he will be 
attending the company’s AGM and has even sends his questions beforehand ‘as not to waste time 
at the AGM’ (TB). In one exceptional case, the CEO of a large banking group contacted Botha prior 
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to the AGM. As all of Botha’s questions were sufficiently answered by the CEO, he did not attend 
the company’s AGM that year. ‘The following year the CEO did exactly the same’ (TB). Although 
Botha sporadically engages management behind closed doors, he prefers to raise his concerns in 
public, either by asking questions at the target companies’ AGMs (Shevel, 2014). As indicated 
earlier, individual shareholders hardly ever get access to management and are therefore limited 
to raising their concerns at AGMs and in the media.  
The chairperson of a large South African company opened its AGM by asking if there were any 
questions and immediately added ‘of course, Theo, it wouldn’t be an AGM unless you had 
questions’ (Rose, 2007b). Journalists have likened Botha’s questioning strategy to a flood or 
barrage (Harris, 2011a; Vanek, 2012c). Botha’s strategy for asking questions at AGMs has changed 
over the years. Where he initially had a long list of questions, he is now much more selective in the 
issues which he would like management to address (TB). His questions have been described as 
probing, prickly, tricky, awkward, embarrassing, uncomfortable, hard-hitting and difficult 
(Anderson, 2006b; De Waal, 2011; Hasenfuss, 2007, 2009b; Hogg, 2010, 2011; Planting, 2012; 
Tarrant, 2014). Media commentators have even remarked that Botha ‘grills’ directors or ‘turns up 
the heat’ (Anderson, 2006b; Carte, 2011; Mantshantsha, 2006). As will be indicated later, directors 
and managers generally respond in a hostile manner to this kind of interrogation. As indicated in 
TABLE 2, Botha has attended 136 AGMs of 54 companies over the research period.  
TABLE 2: Botha’s main modus operandi over the period May 2002 to July 2014(a) & (b) 
Asking questions at AGMs 136 AGMs 
Making comments about a company/manager in the media 34 cases 
Engaging in private discussions with management prior to or after the AGM 8 cases 
Engaging the JSE about ‘misbehaving’ listed companies  3 cases 
Initiating legal proceedings 2 cases 
(a) These categories are not mutually exclusive.  
(b) The names of the companies and the sources used to compile this table are available from the researcher on request.  
Source: Author’s analysis 
Perusal of TABLE 2 shows that the most AGMs that Botha attended in one year (22) occurred in 
2009. The majority of his corporate governance-related engagements (75%) occurred after the 
2008 global financial crisis and highlights the role that corporate governance plays in aggravating 
and perpetuating crises (Mitton, 2002).  
Botha has engaged South African companies across a broad economic spectrum, more 
specifically: cyclical services (25.4%), resources (19.4%), financials (16.4%), non-cyclical 
consumer goods (10.4%), basic industries (9%), general industries (9%), non-cyclical services 
(6%), cyclical consumer goods (3%), information technology (3%) and utilities (1.5%). A 
summary of the financial and ESG issues which Botha has raised at AGMs and in the media since 
2002 is presented in TABLE 3.  
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The evidence in TABLE 3 suggests that Botha is indeed a ‘crusader for good corporate governance’ 
(Hasenfuss, 2006). Botha’s concerns about executive remuneration were often mentioned in the 
same breath as poor financial performance. In line with international trends (Barron, 2014; 
Patton, 2014), Botha criticised companies heavily for failing to disclose the performance targets, 
benchmarks and key performance indicators used to determine the level and nature of executive 
remuneration (Gilmour, 2014; Hedley, 2013; De Waal, 2011; Rose & Shevel, 2009). Botha argues 
that more information is necessary to hold remuneration committees accountable and to 
determine whether executive pay is appropriate or excessive (TB in Crotty, 2012a).  
Botha often highlighted companies’ lack of compliance with the King reports, specifically on 
issues such as the lack of independent directors, poor attendance of board meetings and 
insufficient communication with shareholders. The researcher finds it disconcerting that so many 
JSE-listed companies still (in 2015) disregard many of the recommendations contained in the King 
reports.  
Although Botha has mostly criticised companies, he has, on occasion, applauded some companies 
for improved reporting (Anderson, 2006a; Crotty, 2013). On a question of whether he ever becomes 
nervous at AGMs, Botha responded: ‘Of course I’m nervous, I’m very nervous. But I don’t shout, I 
don’t scream, I just go through the questions’ (TB in Barron, 2008). After meetings, Botha 
generally leaves pretty quickly, but he always requests that his questions and management’s 
replies be properly recorded in the AGM’s minutes (Crotty, 2011a; Petros, 2009). The need for 
sound recordkeeping will allow all shareholders (not only shareholder activists) to hold managers 
accountable for promises they have made.  
In one instance, the company secretary failed to mention any of Botha’s questions or the 
company’s responses in the minutes. As a private request for the information was unsuccessful, 
Botha applied for a copy of the full meeting notes using the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act (Planting, 2014). Unfortunately, his application was unsuccessful (TB). As a last resort, 
shareholder activists can pursue legal proceedings. In 2005, Botha turned to the Johannesburg 
High Court to prevent a large life assurance company from snapping up a smaller rival (Rose, 
2005). Despite his application, the court sanctioned the transaction. Given the high cost of 
litigation, Botha no longer employs this mechanism to fight for the rights of minority 
shareholders. In a few rare cases Botha has also reported suspect corporate behaviour to the JSE 
(Hasenfuss, 2008; Hogg, 2009).  
Like activists in other realms of life, Botha also evokes strong emotions among those he confronts 
(Flam & King, 2007). Having gained some insight into the character, motives and modus operandi 
of Botha, the focus will now shift to an evaluation of what makes him a salient shareholder. 
Attention will be given to the three attributes of shareholder salience, namely power, legitimacy 
and urgency.  
5.3 Which sources of power does Botha pose as an individual shareholder 
activist? 
Shareholder activists use coercive power when they file shareholder resolutions, replace directors 
or CEOs or engage in legal proceedings. In contrast to the US, very few (if any) shareholders in 
South Africa have filed shareholder resolutions in the past two decades (Viviers & Smit, 2015). 
This might be attributed to the high costs associated with doing so. From a cultural point of view, 
it is more acceptable for South African shareholders to engage in private negotiations with 
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management (Vanek, 2012a). Despite Botha following a very public activism approach, he has 
never filed a shareholder resolution.  
In his personal capacity as individual shareholder activist, Botha has not been able to have 
directors or CEOs replaced, but he has expressed very firm views about the quality of certain 
executives (Harris, 2014, Jones, 2014; Seccombe, 2012). As pointed out earlier, Botha has initiated 
legal proceedings only once before to enforce his rights as a minority shareholder (Rose, 2005). 
As this application was unsuccessful, Botha no longer ‘quotes the law or gets involved in litigation’ 
(TB). He deems this route to having his voice heard as too expensive. 
Successfully lobbying for regulation represents a fourth source of coercive power. Long-awaited 
amendments to Regulation 28 of the South African Pension Funds Act (No. 24 of 1956) were 
promulgated in 2011 in response to sustained pressure by a few institutional investors. Although 
Botha was not directly involved in the lobbying process, he supports the amendments (TB).  
Utilitarian power is associated with the provision or withdrawal of capital or other resources from 
companies (Gifford, 2010). Being an individual shareholder who often only owns one share, Botha 
has no utilitarian power. Instead, his prominence as a shareholder activist hinges almost entirely 
on the level of normative power that he has. As explained in TABLE 1, normative power results from 
public or private statements that affect the reputation of the targeted company or individual. 
Botha himself acknowledges that he knows how to use the media to his advantage. Reflecting on 
his first engagement with The Sage Group, he remarked: ‘I got nowhere with them [the directors], 
so I went to the press. They ran the story and that was the end of the company. They had destroyed 
their own reputation. The share price tanked’ (TB in Barron, 2008). More recently, another 
financial institution experienced the ‘Botha sting’ first-hand. Botha claimed that ‘management 
had underestimated the severity of the problem [bad loans] and did not provide adequately for 
loans. The company’s reputation and management’s reputation is tarnished’ (TB in Barry, 2014a).  
So strong is Botha’s normative power that a multi-national mining company had to apologise to 
him in public for denying him access to the company’s AGM. The company secretary not only 
apologised, but also offered to reimburse Botha’s travel expenses to London and to provide 
answers to all the questions he intended to raise at the AGM (Ngcobo, 2011). Botha also insisted 
that Lonmin plc hold a minute of silence at its AGM after the Marikana shooting in 2012 (TB; Crotty, 
2012b). The platinum producer’s failure to show respect for the 50 employees who died in the 
incident damages their reputation, particularly as their mission is said to be based on ‘a values-
based culture’, which includes safety at work (Our mission and values, 2016). Botha’s normative 
power is furthermore evident in the responses he elicits at AGMs. It has been said that Botha 
possesses the rare ability to ‘incite an instant headache’ for executives when he arrives 
unannounced at their AGMs (Rose, 2007b). It could be argued that managers develop a headache 
in anticipation of the reputational damage they know Botha can cause (Bhana, 2010).  
5.4 Is Botha seen as a legitimate individual shareholder activist?  
As indicated earlier, legitimacy can be defined as generalised perceptions or assumptions that 
the actions of an entity or individual are desirable, proper or appropriate within a socially 
constructed value system. In the following section, Botha’s activism endeavours will be evaluated 
in terms of individual, pragmatic and societal legitimacy.  
Individual legitimacy can be measured in terms of the expertise, experience, status and credibility 
of the individual in question. The degree to which a shareholder activist is considered legitimate 
can be viewed from various perspectives. For the purpose of this article, two perspectives are 
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deemed particularly important: perspectives from those who have been engaged by Botha in the 
past (such as directors, executives and company secretaries) and perspectives from social 
commentators (such as journalists). Views from fellow shareholders, policy-makers and the 
public at large could be investigated in future research.  
The findings of this study suggest that both of the considered groups view Botha as an individual 
shareholder activist whose actions are ‘desirable, proper and appropriate’ within the South 
African investment context. His expertise, experience and status are derived from his accounting 
education, extensive knowledge of corporate governance codes, attentive study of annual reports 
and regular attendance of AGMs. Not only does Botha have an eye for detail, but he also ensures 
that his facts (or arrows as he calls them) are correct before he confronts managers. To strengthen 
his case, Botha has even requested information from the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
to clarify issues in the annual report of a dual-listed company before confronting the company 
and going public (Hasenfuss, 2010). The fact that Botha does not criticise companies and 
directors before verifying all the relevant facts increases his legitimacy.  
Perceptions between the two groups diverge when it comes to the topic of credibility. Whereas 
‘chairmen often can’t stand the sight of him’ (Barron, 2008), journalists argue that South Africa 
needs more people like Botha who are ‘informed and unafraid of asking powerful people 
uncomfortable questions’ (Ngcobo, 2011). The following extracts paint a picture of how directors 
and managers perceive and respond to Botha’s engagements; words in brackets have been 
inserted by the researcher:  
 ‘Many companies take a sour view of Botha pitching up at their shareholder meetings with a 
raft of questions’ (Sexwale and the shy activist, 2007). 
 Botha causes ‘controversy everywhere he goes’. ‘It didn’t take long after the start of the 
shareholders’ meeting for Botha to rattle the cage. The chairman was immediately annoyed 
when Botha raised his hand for a question. “How many questions do you have?” “It depends 
on how you answer them”, Botha replied’ (Mamtse, 2007). 
 ‘His questions make us [directors] look silly’ (Keeping tycoons on their toes, 2007). 
 ‘Chairmen hate him [for exposing them]. He has been threatened, ranted at, patronised, 
called an idiot and thrown out of meetings. Some of his victims have suggested that Botha is 
just an egomaniac who loves being in the newspapers’ (Barron, 2008). 
 The director’s response was ‘aggressive, dismissive and abrupt’ (Barron, 2008). 
 Botha is seen as a ‘nuisance’ (Ngcobo, 2011). 
 ‘Most company chairmen don’t like seeing Theo Botha turning up at their AGMs’ (Hogg, 2011). 
 ‘One could feel the tension in the room following Botha’s barrage of questions. It was as if we 
were on a knife-edge’ (Vanek, 2012c).  
 ‘AGMs in South Africa are usually dull affairs. That’s apart from the cold sweat directors break 
out into if they see Botha walking through the door armed with his list of difficult questions’ 
(Williams, 2013).  
 Botha ensured the meeting ‘was not without a little frisson’ (Crotty, 2014).  
From the above it can be deduced that many chairpersons and directors in South Africa are 
uncomfortable with Botha’s actions and that many do not perceive Botha as a credible 
shareholder activist. Botha himself acknowledges that boards see him as an ‘irritation’ (TB in 
Steyn, 2011). Even so, he continues to engage them year after year. Social commentators, 
however, recognise the key role that Botha has played in bringing about corporate change. 
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Tredway (2004), for example, asserts that Botha’s presence at an AGM ensures that ‘directors are 
asked the sort of questions that other shareholders should be asking were they not apathetic or 
embedded’.  
Another journalist affirms that Botha is not a typical activist. ‘He doesn’t carry placards or wear 
T-shirts with socialist slogans. He is always mild-mannered, well-spoken and neatly dressed’ 
(Keeping tycoons on their toes, 2007). Steyn (2011) also contends that it is hard to judge from 
Botha’s business-like appearance and demeanour, that he can be a ‘pesky thorn in the side of 
many large corporations’. 
Shareholder activists can develop pragmatic legitimacy in two ways: firstly, by presenting a 
convincing argument for why their actions are in the best interest of the company and secondly 
by providing the company with new information (Gifford, 2010). Botha has a sound track record 
in both of these areas. Many of the issues highlighted by Botha could, if left unattended, result in 
adverse financial implications for the company in question. Poor environmental practices could, 
for example, lead to litigation and costly fines. Against this background, Mpofu (2013) was not 
incorrect in asserting that Botha is ‘that shareholder any business executive ought to listen to’.  
Botha’s public criticism of companies has been shown to have an immediate and significant 
negative impact on their share prices (Bhana, 2010). This finding implies that Botha’s criticism 
contains valuable information for both management and the rest of the market. However, one 
author observed ‘a weariness’ in Botha’s voice when Botha referred to the ‘free advice’ he gives 
JSE-listed companies with little appreciation, except from the media (Keeping tycoons on their 
toes, 2007).  
Social legitimacy depends on the extent to which a shareholder embodies or reflects a position 
widely accepted in society (Gifford, 2010). Within the South African context, Botha has been quite 
vocal about issues that are central to the creation of a just society. These include the lack of 
transformation (especially at board level), HIV/AIDS-related issues, and the ever-increasing 
wage gap (Barron, 2008, 2014; Gilmour, 2014; Sathekge, 2011; Tarrant, 2013). More recently, he 
has also engaged with companies on sustainability concerns and the impact that poor 
environmental practices have on local communities (Crotty, 2013; Salgado, 2008).  
Social legitimacy also stems from the existence of norms and codes of conduct as well as a 
supportive political and policy environment. Although South Africa has been a pioneer in the 
development and implementation of good corporate governance codes by means of the King I, II 
and III reports, Botha is very sceptical of the effectiveness of these codes (Carte, 2009; Crotty, 
2009a). As a veteran shareholder activist (Barron, 2014), Botha was invited to serve as 
independent committee member of the team that designed the Code for Responsible Investing in 
South Africa (Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2014). This code provides guidance to 
institutional investors in adhering to the amended Regulation 28 and King III’s recommendations.  
5.5 Does urgency play a role in making Botha a salient individual 
shareholder activist? 
The third attribute of shareholder salience is that of urgency. Urgency, in turn, depends on the 
time-sensitivity and criticality of the relationship between the shareholder and management. 
Given the nature of this study, only criticality was deemed relevant. Criticality can be gauged in 
terms of behaviour that illustrates a resolve or determination to address issues of concern 
(Gifford, 2010).  
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Criticality is associated with assertiveness of tone, persistence and the willingness to apply 
resources. Assertiveness of tone implies that the shareholder should be unafraid of asking 
difficult questions. Botha is most definitely an assertive shareholder activist. He has often been 
described as being outspoken, vocal, challenging, demanding and adamant (Ashton, 2008; 
Hasenfuss, 2008, 2009c; Rose, 2007a; Slabbert, 2013). Stated differently, Botha ‘doesn’t mince 
his words about the lack of good corporate governance’ (Mantshantsha, 2009).  
Botha’s insistence on answers and official recordkeeping is well noted. More than one South 
African director has ‘been pressed’ for explanations (Monteiro, 2009; Vanek, 2012b) or has been 
subjected to ‘stinging criticism’ from Botha (Cynthia Carroll takes over as Anglo Platinum 
chairperson, 2010). An assertive or confrontational activism style (such as that exhibited by 
Botha) has proved to be more successful than a less aggressive style (Klein & Zur, 2009).  
Criticality is also measured in terms of persistence. This source of salience has been the hallmark 
of many leading activists, most notably Mahatma Ghandi and Nelson Mandela. Persistence is 
particularly important in the face of (apparent) failure and might explain why Botha often returns 
to the same companies year after year. In more than a third of cases, Botha attended the AGMs of 
the same company for three consecutive years. Botha admits that he is tenacious in pursuing his 
objectives (TB). Further evidence of Botha’s persistence can be gleaned from newspaper reports 
in which he is described as ‘relentless’ and ‘bloody-minded’ (Barron, 2008; Shevel, 2014; Steyn, 
2011). Mpofu (2013) succinctly captures Botha’s determination in the following quote: ‘Botha’s 
relentless push to put his money where his mouth is has on several occasions led him on a collision 
course with various boards.’ 
Despite being a ‘lone voice’ (Harris, 2011b; Vanek, 2012d), Botha has persisted in engaging JSE-
listed companies on issues they ‘would rather have kept to themselves’ (Barron, 2008). He admits 
that it has been a constant, uphill struggle, but that he is slowly starting to see improved 
governance among JSE-listed companies (TB in Steyn, 2011). Botha’s claim concurs with De Bakker 
and Den Hond (2008), who found that the presence of shareholder activists at AGMs (albeit 
individual activists) has led to changes in corporate policies. They attributed these changes to 
target companies’ fear of reputational damage.  
The final measure of criticality relates to a shareholder’s willingness to apply resources. Botha 
has always used his own finances to prepare for and attend AGMs throughout South Africa (TB; 
Mamste, 2007; Petros, 2009). He has also travelled to London at his own expense, to attend a 
number of AGMs of dual-listed companies (Crotty, 2011b, 2013; Rose & Shevel, 2009; Steyn, 2011). 
Botha has been quite critical of dual-listed companies that do not provide their South African 
shareholders with video or telephonic links to their AGM in London (Hasenfuss, 2009a). 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
To address the lack of academic research on individual shareholder activism, this article set out 
to identify the motives, modus operandi and sources of salience of a prominent individual 
shareholder activist. The document analysis and in-depth interview with Botha revealed that he 
not only has a clear goal, namely to keep managers and directors accountable, but is also very 
passionate about achieving this goal. He prepares meticulously before engaging companies, 
which strengthens perceptions regarding his individual legitimacy.  
According to Bhana (2010), Botha also has an ‘impressive ability’ to anticipate the effects of 
corporate decisions on operating profitability. Although Botha is widely regarded as a corporate 
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governance expert, he has also questioned companies on a range of other socially relevant issues, 
thereby enhancing his level of social legitimacy. The scope of Botha’s questions, and the fact that 
he does not benefit financially from his engagements, reflects both a utilitarian and a 
deontological ethical orientation. The former is evident from his efforts to promote 
transformation in businesses, whereas the latter is reflected in his concerns about adherence to 
corporate governance codes. 
As an experienced shareholder activist, Botha knows how to use the media to his advantage, which 
gives him substantial normative power. He has also gained invaluable experience over the years 
by engaging companies across the economic spectrum. Botha is an assertive and persistent 
activist who is willing to apply his own resources to engage companies. Although tenacious, Botha 
is still regarded as being mild-mannered and polite (Keeping tycoons on their toes, 2007; Mamtse, 
2007). He is not afraid to speak his mind and has often used humour to defuse potentially tense 
situations (Barron, 2008).  
The findings of this study suggest that Botha has a strong internal locus of control and is thus 
likely to continue with his efforts to improve corporate policies and practices in South Africa. 
However, he admits that he is tired of being the only one who seems to be concerned about good 
governance and would like more South African investors, big or small, engaging local companies 
(TB; Hogg, 2010; Shevel, 2014). In an attempt to encourage other investors to vote at AGMs, Botha 
has recently started to publish his proxy opinions online (Barry, 2014b). Finally, Botha would like 
to see King III being simplified to encourage greater compliance among South African companies 
(Planting, 2012).  
The findings of this study suggest that shareholder salience, especially in the case of an individual 
shareholder, calls for passion, strength of conviction, the ability to use the media to one’s 
advantage and the cultivation of individual, pragmatic and societal legitimacy. Even more 
important is the resolve to persevere in one’s attempts to bring about greater corporate 
accountability and transparency, despite real or perceived resistance.  
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